I think that you think that I think

Deadlines are looming. Which means I have a chapter on the relationship between game theory and video games. This chapter is longish.
But if anyone has an interest in this eternally fascinating topic I would love some critical comments. So let me know.
Here’s the brief summary of the chapter: Continue reading I think that you think that I think

Looking for help: Statistical question

UPDATE: This is no longer the problem – the real problem is outlined here.

No use trying to hide it: I need to look everything up when doing simple statistics.

Perhaps you can help me with a simple question?
Here goes:

Let’s say you are convinced that Mondays, Tuesdays and Wednesdays differ as to the amount of rainfall. To test this, you measure the amount of rainfall (in millimeters) on these three days over a period of six weeks.

You get (averages):
Monday: 10mm
Tuesday: 30mm
Wednesday: 15mm

I suppose the null hypothesis must be that the rainfall did not differ.
How do you express the strength of the difference in these three cases? That is: How certain are you that the measured difference is non-coincidental?

Help would be appreciated!

Lost in transcription

They hoped against hope. Their fears grew ever stronger.
But as of a moment ago, it is done. My transcription woes are over. With the final words: “Am I wearing a white helmet?” the last session has been transcribed and with that the curse has been lifted.
Never again :-)

(Next step: Code and analyze the logs in Nvivo. Oh, sweet and joyful task)

See also: This and this

Equilibrial

An equilibrium is a point towards which a system tends to move or a point which, once reached, tends to be stable.
The concept originates in physics. Imagine a room with a certain air temperature. You add a certain volume of warmer air and after a while the air in the room settles on a new higher temperature (all other things being, as always, equal).
In economics Adam Smith’s “invisible hand” provides an equlibrium. In a market economy, supply and demand make prices settle on a certain equilibrium point.

In terms of video games, two types of equilibria are important.

Equity equilibrium: A game may be constructed in a way which produces an a drift towards equality of score. Pool is a good example. The player with the most balls left has the best chances of actually landing a ball in a pocket. Thus, Pool is a game with an equity bias. All other things being equal, the score will tend to even out. Other games are equity neutral. In table tennis, for instance, winning a point does not increase or decrease one’s chances of winning the next ball. The game simply doesn’t care, if you will. Still other games have an inequity bias. Here, winning a round (or whatever) increases one’s chances of winning more. Chess is an example. Having many pieces left means having more power over the board. Once you’re ahead, you’re likely to stay ahead. This can all be understood in terms of feedback in the cybernetic sense of that word (see for instance Salen and Zimmerman’s Rules of Play on cybernetics).

Strategic equilibrium: A game may be constructed in a way which makes certain strategies highly succesful, sometimes given certain strategies played by the other player(s). In game theory terms a (Nash) equilibrium is a point where no player will unilaterally change his strategy – a point where both (or all) players are playing the best strategy given what the other player is playing. Game designers tend to dislike “best strategies” in this sense, as it implies that any choice facing the player is an uninteresting one (e.g. see Morris and Rollings’ discussion of strategic dominance). There are a number of challenges related to applying the idea to video games – chief among these are that it tends to miss the issue of skill (as it over-emphasises choice) and that it tends to miss the fact that playing video games is generally a very inductive process in which finding a “very good” strategy is a pleasant task in itself. Thus while clearly applicable and interesting, the concept is less than simple (or more than simple, if you prefer difficult things) as I will discuss in what-will-one-day be chapter 3 of my Dissertation. So now you know.

The triumphant return of… media studies

Okay, here’s an excerpt from a chapter I’m writing on the importance of how one chooses to conceptualize the “player”. I start (more or less) by pointing to the implications of various user/audience views in other fields. Here’s my draft take on the issue in media studies. Comments shall be welcome, here or by email. Continue reading The triumphant return of… media studies

tDSoT takes a new direction

Deeply buried beneath theoretical arcana, I hereby proclaim that this blog shall henceforth mostly be concerned with my dissertational scriblings. At random intervals I will raise a topic or post paragraphs/sections from my manuscript in the vain hope that someone (that’s you!) will take it upon him/her-self to think along and perhaps to comment should some sequence of words strike you as discussable, unreasonable or just plain nuts.